Cross-request KV cache exposure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model (155 responses)
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This is an SGLANG and a Cloudflare bug long before it is a Z.AI model bug, I don't see what they could have done about it. Cloudflare should own it instead of naming other (imo innocent) parties in the title.
There's a huge amount of unnecessary extraneous details in the headline that distract from "this is a Cloudflare bug".
A better title would be "Cross-request KV cache exposure in Cloudflare provisioned GLM-5.3 Workers AI model" because it narrows culpability. Just posting it on the Cloudflare blog isn't enough for that in the age of AI and SEO data-scrapes and it'd be surprising to me if the authors didn't know that.
Did you ever given any thought about how confusing the title may be?
Did AI write this title and you just use it without ever wondering if it makes sense at all?
Which part of that is not claiming the exposure is in X model? Cloudflare is stopping to be cool, this is the start. I guess, cf is now big enough for enshitification to start.
Then you would used "endpoint" instead of "model". In fact, there's actually zero reasons to put any model or endpoint in the title if the bug is yours alone.
Most people will read this headline and assume Cloudflare is intentionally trying to squash open-weight models. Given how superfluous the model is to the content, it's easy to believe that narrative.
If that wasn't your intent, you really ought to change the title ASAP. Time is ticking before tech journalists and social media decide to run with that narrative and make your public relations department sad.
It effects the _endpoint serving GLM-5.3_
I'm not sure how else you'd identify the GLM-5.3 serving endpoint without naming GLM-5.3.
That said, having the word "model" in the title is misleading imo
"On September 8, 2026, we were alerted by a security researcher, Gadi Evron from Knostic, to a tenant isolation issue affecting the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model (@cf/zai-org/glm-5.3) starting on August 27, 2026."
Meaning the issue was a cache exposure with the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model. If the title was, "Cache exposure issue with GLM-5.3," I would agree it's ambiguous and maybe intentionally harmful. But it literally says, "Workers AI model" which is clearly a Cloudflare product.
Downthread I suggested "Cloudflare configuration error leaked data between user sessions" which I think is far better. You could improve on it further: "Cloudflare AI worker configuration error leaked data between user sessions". But this could have happened with any model.
Did they advertise it as 1,048,576 token when they only had room for 681,280 tokens?
At a minimum someone should have realized during testing that their utilization figures are off by 40%.
A much better title would be "Cloudflare configuration error leaked data between user sessions"
They assumed that it wasn't like an overflow exploit, despite the fact that's exactly what they'd set up to happen, on the grounds of thinking the equivalent of, "oh this probably uses smart pointers, we'll be fine".
That's how I read it anyway.
> We were aware of this mismatch before launch
Isn't normal. Am I misunderstanding or are they openly confessing they've stopped caring about quality at all? Why would you launch when you know it's wrong?
Also impressed with the speed to address the issue unplug the model and then pretty quick remediation, the speed to remediation matters less to me, but good to see they can act quickly on their platform to kill the serving of the model.
> We expected the engine to return an error for any prompt it could not process, and our long-context tests returned successful responses, so we did not believe this to be an issue
Surely “we expected and error but got a successful response” merits investigating rather than moving on?
I copied the clipboard from the device, and my clipboard was full of another users credentials that they were obviously trying to paste into their own VM. Their devices were leaking clipboard data to each other.
I reported the vulnerability and asked if there was any bounty program (I wasn't looking for vulnerabilities but didn't hurt to ask), to which they said no, but they could send me a signed letter thanking me of my contributions. I said, great, thanks - and never heard back.
All pretty disappointing.
This is insane? They thought it would return errors for long context, which didn’t happen, and they proceeded assuming it was fine? Didn’t even investigate the known misconfiguration and issue before going to production?